Michael Richard Schubarth v. State of Utah : Appeal from a Order by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Michael Richard Schubarth v. State of Utah :
Appeal from a Order
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; .
Bryan Sidwell; Counsel for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Schubarth v. Utah, No. 20040361 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4949
Bryan Sidwell #7625 
Attorney for Appellant 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH ] 
Appellant. 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee. ] 
) CaseNo.20040361-CA 
Priority: 2 
APPEAL FROM A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING, WHERE THE 
APPELLANT WAS FOUND IN VIOLATION OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT 
Bryan Sidwell #7625 
Attorney for Appellant 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435)789-4900 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6th FL 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 1 6 2004 
Bryan Sidwell #7625 
Attorney for Appellant 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH ] 
Appellant. 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 20040361-CA 
Priority: 2 
APPEAL FROM A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING, WHERE THE 
APPELLANT WAS FOUND IN VIOLATION OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT 
Bryan Sidwell #7625 
Attorney for Appellant 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6 ^ 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 1 10 
ARGUMENT II 13 
ARGUMENT III 17 
CONCLUSION 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 
ADDENDUM 23 
ATTACHMENT A 
Affidavit of Defendant in Advance of Guilty Plea and Agreement 
ATTACHMENT B 
Exhibit 2 
1 
TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE NO. 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County. 
44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2002) 17,20 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn. 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) 5,17 
State v. Garcia. 18 P.3d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 18 
State v. Kav. 717 P. 2d 1294 (Utah 1986) 10,11 
State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 10,11,12 
State v. Norton. 67 P.3d 1050 (Utah App. 2003) 4 
State v. Tate. 989 P. 2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 4,5,16 
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. G. Kay. Inc.. 78 P.3d 612 4,13 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5) 3,9,10,12,31 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-3(7) 12 
RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULE 3 3 
2 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH ) 
Appellant, 
) 
v. Case NO. 20040361-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Appellee. Priority: 2 
) 
APPELLANT BRIEF MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to 
decide the appeal is Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3. "An appeal may be taken 
from a district or juvenile Court to the appellate court from all final orders or judgments". 
On or about November 26th, 20025 Michael Richard Schubarth entered into a plea in 
abeyance agreement. During an Order to Show Cause hearing on or about January 29, 
2004, Judge Anderson found that Mr. Schubarth had violated his plea in abeyance 
agreement, the guilty pleas were entered against Mr. Schubarth. Judge John R. Anderson 
sentenced Mr. Schubarth on April 27, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Was the plea in abeyance agreement void because it was not entered in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5) and therefore did the trial court 
err in not allowing a misplea. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW. A question of statutory interpretation is reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. Norton, 67 P. 3d 
1050 (Utah App. 2003). 
II. Did the trial court err when the trial court found that Mr. Schubarth violated a 
law; by issuing a bad check. 
Point I 
The State did not introduce sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that 
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The court's findings are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. G. Kay, Inc., 78 P.3d 612 (Utah 
2003). 
Point II 
Mr. Schubarth argues that the court violated his due process rights by 
denying him the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "We review the trial court's decision to 
revoke defendant's probation for correctness and accord it no particular deference." State 
v. Tate. 989 P.2d 73 H 8 (Utah Ct App. 1999). 
III. Did the trial err in interpreting the plea in abeyance agreement and therefore err 
in revoking Mr. Schubarth's probation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The court reviews the trial court's decision to revoke 
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defendant's probation for correctness and accords it no particular deference. State v. 
Tate. 989 P.2d 73 ^ 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn. 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Issue I. The Appellant preserved this issue by written motion to the judge and at 
the Order to Show Cause hearing: The Court: "Okay, help me with this one. I am 
concerned about this one." R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 17-18. Mr. Thomas: "Yes." R. at 
705. Tr. p. 8, line 19. The Court: "The statute says a plea in abeyance cannot exceed 
three years. What are we going to do with that? R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 20 &21. Mr. 
Thomas: I reviewed that statute as well, and that was brought up, of course, by the 
defendant in his handwritten motion." R. at 705. Tr. p. 8, line 22-24. The defendant's 
counsel further stated: Mr. Beaslin: Well, I've reviewed that motion also, you Honor. 
That's 77-2(a> 2(5) on that three-year abeyance as indicated." R. at 705. Tr. p. 10, line 
4-6. Further during Mr. Schubarth's testimony he stated: "The plea agreement was 
dropped on me that day, and it was set for six years. No one said there was a three-year 
statute, and I asked to counter . . ." R. at 705. Tr. p. 51, line 6-8. If the defendant did not 
properly preserve this issue he argues plain error. 
Issue II. The State of Utah tried to introduce hearsay evidence with regard to Mr. 
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Schubarth having a bad check charge in Nevada. R. at 705. Tr. p. 22, line 7-18. Mr. 
Schubarth's counsel objected, "I think maybe I'd object to that, your Honor"., R. at 705, 
Tr. p. 23, line 9-10. Other hearsay evidence was introduced and Mr. Schubarth's counsel 
objected, "Your Honor, I would object to that as being hearsay, your Honor." R. at 705, 
Tr. p. 25, line 22-23. If the defendant did not properly preserve this issue he argues plain 
error. 
Issue III. Mr. Schubarth's attorney argued that the court should interpret the 
agreement in the way that the first payment was paid on time. "So I think you can 
interpret those from what Mr. Schubarth has said here today, and also the fact (inaudible) 
he was in fact incarcerated he did pay what would be the $22,800, which was the first 
payment, but the same was late." R. at 705. Tr. p. 55, line 9-12. If this issue was not 
properly reserved Mr. Schubarth argues plain error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
The appeal is taken from the guilty pleas entered by Judge Anderson after an order 
to show cause hearing was held on January 29, 2004. The appeal is taken from the entry 
of the guilty pleas and the sentence. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
On November 26, 2002, the State of Utah and Mr. Schubarth entered into a plea 
agreement. The agreement stated, ""Defendant shall make payment towards restitution in 
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the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 
have not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he 
has substantially complied with the restitution payments." R. at 344. 
The State of Utah believed that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea in abeyance 
agreement and filed an Order to Show Cause. R. at 396. The Order to Show Cause 
hearing was held on January 29, 2004. R. at 557. At the Order to Show Cause hearing 
the court found that Mr. Schubarth violated his plea in abeyance agreement. R. at 705. 
Tr. p. 58, line 3-9. Mr. Schubarth was sentenced on April 27, 2004. R. at 706. 
III. Statement of the Facts 
On or about November 26, 2002, Mr. Schubarth entered into a plea in abeyance 
agreement with the State of Utah. R. at 344-366. In accordance with the agreement, Mr. 
Schubarth pled no contest to thirty one counts. R. at 344-346. In exchange for Mr. 
Schubarth's plea, the pleas were to be held in abeyance for six years. R. at 359. In 
accordance with the agreement Mr. Schubarth agreed to violate no laws of the United 
States, the State of Utah or any municipality during the term of this agreement. R. at 359. 
Further, Mr. Schubarth agreed to make payments toward restitution in the amount of 
$22,880.00 each six months. R. at 360. The agreement further stated that "if the 
payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear in 
this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially complied with the restitution 
payments". R. at 360. Finally, the agreement stated that Mr. Schubarth "shall make full 
7 
payment of restitution on or about November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of 
restitution on or about November 26, 2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result 
in the entry on the record of all pleas." R. at 361. 
Believing that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea agreement the State of Utah 
filed an Order to Show Cause. R. at 396-400. The Order to Show Cause hearing was 
held on January 29, 2004. R. at 557-560 and R. at 705. At the hearing evidence was 
introduced that Mr. Schubarth had made a restitution payment of $10,000.00 on May 28, 
2003. R. at 705, Tr. p. 21, line 3-9. Mr. Schubarth made another restitution payment of 
$12,880.00 on July 8, 2003. R. at 705, Tr. p. 21, line 16-17. See Exhibit 1. R. at 707. 
The State of Utah also introduced hearsay evidence that Mr. Schubarth had written 
a bad check in Nevada. "After this plea had entered, had you received notification from 
any Nevada authority that the defendant had been charged with issuing a bad check?" R. 
at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 7-9. "Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney General's office 
that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest for 
issuing a bad check". R. at 22, Tr. p. 22, line 10-12. However, at the hearing Mr. 
Schubarth clearly testified that he had not been convicted of any charge. R. at 705, Tr. p. 
48, line 16-17. The State did not introduce any evidence that Mr. Schubarth was 
convicted of any charge, including the bad check charge. 
In addition, the State of Utah introduced numerous hearsay statements regarding 
other possible criminal charges against the defendant. R. at 705. After the court heard 
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the evidence, the court found that Mr. Schubarth had violated the plea in abeyance 
agreement. R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 10-11. The court used the following rationale to 
determine that the agreement was violated: "I'm not going to give a lot - any reliance on 
the theft by false pretenses case. He hasn't been convicted yet. He has a presumption of 
innocence on that." R. at 705. Tr. p. 57, line 23-25. "I'm not going to use that for a 
basis. He did violate a law. He wrote a bad check and was apparently satisfied that in the 
Sparks, Nevada Justice Court, and he did not make the payment of $22,8800 on the due 
date." R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 3-6. 
Summary of Argument 
Issue I: Mr. Schubarth argues that the trial court erred in not declaring a misplea 
and setting the matter for a trial, because the plea in abeyance agreement was entered in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5). Since the agreement was entered 
in violation of Section 77-2a-2(5) there is obvious error. By declaring a misplea neither 
party will be prejudiced. 
Issue II: 
Point I: The State did not introduce sufficient evidence for the court to find that 
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check. 
Point II: Mr. Schubarth argues that the court violated his due process right by 
denying him the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses. 
Issue HI: Mr. Schubarth argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the plea in 
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abeyance agreement. The court used a time is of the essence standard in determining 
whether Mr. Schubarth complied with the plea in abeyance agreement. The proper 
standard of review should been whether Mr. Schubarth had substantially complied with 
the agreement. Mr. Schubarth argues that he did substantially comply with the agreement 
and therefore, he did not violate the agreement. Mr. Schubarth further argues the only 
strict deadline of payment in the agreement was that the total restitution was to be paid on 
or about November 26, 2008. 
ARGUMENT I 
ISSUE 
WAS THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT VOID BECAUSE 
IT WAS NOT ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 77-2a-2(5) AND THEREFORE DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT 
ALLOWING A MISPLEA 
RULE 
c
"[T]he trial court may not refuse to comply with the terms of the accepted plea 
agreement unless circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea [i.e., manifest 
necessity]; otherwise, the double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the 
defendant.'" State v. Moss, 921 P. 2d 102L f 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) citing (State v. Kav. 
717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). "The court stated, a "'misplea can properly be granted [1] 
where obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms of the 
acceptance of the plea agreement and [2] no undue prejudice to the defendant is 
apparent." Id. at f 6. 
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'The court in Kay explained when manifest necessity exists, i.e., when the trial 
court has committed obvious reversible error." State v.Moss, at ^[7. "From a review of 
the due process cases discussed herein and Kay's conclusion that there is no undue 
prejudice so long as the defendant is restored to the same position as he or she would 
have been in absent the plea, we conclude that to establish undue prejudice a defendant 
must show that he or she has taken some affirmative action which would materially and 
substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent trial. Id. atf 8. 
Analysis 
In this matter Mr. Schubarth believes that the court should have declared a misplea 
and set the matter for trial. It is clear that even the trial court understood this alternative, 
but chose not to declare a misplea. The trial court stated, "Yeah, and I guess the 
alternative is - the alternative is to set it aside totally and find a trial date." R. at 705, Tr. 
p. 11, line 1-2. Mr. Schubarth argues that the proper procedure would have been for the 
court to follow his first reaction and set the plea aside and set a new trial date. 
In Moss v. State, the defendant entered into a plea in abeyance agreement with the 
State of Utah. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah Ct. App). The defendant had been charged 
with a first degree felony of rape of a child. Id. As part of a plea bargain the defendant 
agreed to pled guilty to "attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony, on the 
condition his plea be held in abeyance for twenty-four months at which time the charges 
would be dismissed upon the trial court's determination that defendant had complied with 
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the terms of the plea agreement". Id. 
Subsequent to the defendant pleading guilty, the Utah Attorney General's Office 
determined defendant's plea violated section 77-2a-3(7), which prohibited entry of a plea 
in abeyance in any case involving allegations of a sexual abuse against a victim younger 
than fourteen years of age. Id. When the problem was brought to the attention of the trial 
court, the trial court set the plea aside. Id. In Moss, the court held that there would be no 
double jeopardy problem if there is a misplea based on a showing of Manifest necessity 
and no undue prejudice to the defendant. Id. 
In Moss, the court noted that there is manifest necessity where obvious reversible 
error has been committed in connection with the terms of the acceptance of the plea 
agreement. Id. In Moss, the court held that when a plea is taken in contravention of the 
express terms of section 77-2a-3(7), that this constituted obvious reversible error. Id. 
Likewise, Mr. Schubarth argues that his plea should be declared a misplea based 
on manifest necessity. Mr. Schubarth's plea in abeyance agreement placing him on 
probation for 6 years was taken in contravention of the express terms of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5), which states that a plea in abeyance for a felony cannot be 
for a period longer than three years. Since Mr. Schubarth's plea in abeyance agreement 
clearly violates Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5) it is obvious reversible error. 
With regard to the second prong, undue prejudice, Mr. Schubarth will receive no 
undue prejudice by setting the plea agreement aside, both parties would be restored to 
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their original, pre-plea positions. 
Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth requests that the court declare a misplea and set the 
matter for trial, placing both parties in the position they were in before the plea. 
ARGUMENT II 
ISSUE 
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN THE COURT FOUND THAT MR. SCHUBARTH 
VIOLATED A LAW, BY ISSUING A BAD CHECK 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID NOT INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT 
TO FIND THAT MR. SCHUBARTH HAD VIOLATED A LAW BY WRITING A BAD 
CHECK 
RULE 
The trial court's findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah 
Dept. of Transp. v. G. Kav Inc.. 78 P.3d 612 (Utah 2003). 
ANALYSIS 
In the courts findings the court states, "He did violate a law. He wrote a bad check 
and was apparently satisfied that in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court..." R. at 705, Tr. p. 
58, lines 3-4. This finding is clearly erroneous and goes against the evidence admitted at 
the Order to Show Cause hearing. The only evidence introduced at the hearing that Mr. 
Schubarth had violated a law by writing a bad check is as follows: the State introduced 
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the following evidence by Michael Hines: "After this plea had entered, had you received 
notification from any Nevada authority that the defendant had been charged with issuing a 
bad check?" R. at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 7-9. "Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney 
General's Office that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant had been issued 
for his arrest for issuing a bad check." R. at 705, Tr. p. 22, line 10-12. "Okay. During 
that were you also notified and/or did you have an opportunity to review documents that 
defendant also received a warrant for failure to appear in that particular case?" R. at 705, 
Tr. p. 22, line 13-16. "So this really addresses a charge having been filed and his failure 
to appear, but it doesn't say what happened to it, right? That is correct." R. at 705, Tr. p. 
23, line 5-8. Mr. Schubarth's attorney then stated, "I think maybe I'd object to that, your 
Honor, as to the issue because it doesn't set forth what happened after that or if he was 
picked up or what happened. It only says a charge was made." R. at 705, Tr. p. 23, line 
9-12. 
In addition, to the statements made above by Michael Hines, the state introduced 
into evidence a certified court docket showing that a complaint had been filed against Mr. 
Schubarth for drawing and passing a check without sufficient funds with intent to 
Defraud. See Exhibit 2. R. at 707. The only thing contained on this exhibit was 
information that Mr. Schubarth had been charged and had failed to appear for a hearing. 
There is no indication that Mr. Schubarth was found guilty. Further, since this was not a 
felony there was not even a probable cause statement for a bind-over. Finally, Mr. 
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Schubarth testified that he pled not guilty. R. at 705, Tr. p. 39, line 7-8. 
In this matter, the State of Utah and the court have equated being charged with a 
crime as the same as violating a crime. The State of Utah introduced evidence that Mr. 
Schubarth was charged with a crime but they produced no evidence that he violated a 
crime. They never produced witnesses testifying that he wrote a check, that the check 
was signed by him, that there was insufficient funds in an account, nothing. The State of 
Utah believes it is enough to show that one is charged with a crime and that is sufficient. 
Mr. Schubarth argues that this is insufficient evidence to prove that he violated a 
crime under a preponderance of an evidence standard. Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth 
believes the court clearly erred in finding that he had violated a law, by writing a bad 
check. 
POINT II 
MR. SCHUBARTH ARGUES THAT THE COURT VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS 
RIGHT BY DENYING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT ADVERSE 
WITNESS 
RULE 
"In probation revocation proceedings where the defendant denies violating the 
conditions of his or her parole, the persons who have given adverse information on which 
the allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for other good cause otherwise orders." State v. Tate, 989 
15 
P.2d73 Tf 11 (Utah App. Ct. 1999). A finding of good cause required the trial court to 
balance the defendant's interest in cross-examining a witness against the State's need to 
use a particular hearsay statement. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
In Tate, and in the present case, the defendant's were brought before the court to 
revoke their probation. In Tate and in the present case, the State of Utah, sought to make 
its case solely through hearsay evidence, neither in Tate nor the present case did the State 
call individuals with personal knowledge of the alleged incidents. Finally, in Tate and in 
the present case, both trial courts failed to determine there is good cause for not 
permitting the probationer to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant whose statement is 
sought to be introduced as evidence, before admitting hearsay. 
In Tate, the Court concluded that the trial court's admission of hearsay, in the 
absence of a specific finding of good cause for denying confrontations, constitutes 
reversible error. Id. at [^17. The Court held that the trial court improperly determined that 
Tate violated his probation and therefore vacated the trial court's order terminating his 
probation. Id. 
In this matter, Mr. Schubarth requests that the order terminating his probation be 
vacated. He believes that the trial court acted improperly by not allowing him to cross-
examine the individuals who alleged that he had written a bad check, including cross-
examining individuals about the following information: that Mr. Schubarth had written a 
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bad check, that he signed the check and that he had insufficient funds in his account etc. 
ARGUMENT HI 
ISSUE 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE ERROR IN REVOKING MR. SCHUBARTH'S 
PROBATION 
RULE 
Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) "We construe an ambiguous 
order under the rules that apply to other legal documents. Specifically, we look to the 
language of the order, and we [may] resort to the pleadings and findings. Where 
construction is called for, it is the duty of the court to interpret an ambiguity [in a manner 
that makes] the judgement more reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and [that] brings 
the judgement into harmony with the facts and the law." Culbertson v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 44 P.3d 642 f 15 (Utah 2002). "In addition, we 
construe any ambiguities in the order against the prevailing parties who drafted i t . . . " Id. 
Mr. Schubarth believes this issue was preserved on the record when his counsel 
stated, "So I think you can interpret those form what Mr. Schubarth has said here today, 
and also the fact (inaudible) he was incarcerated he did pay what would be the $22,880, 
which was the first, but the same was late." R. at 705. Tr. p. 55, line 9-12. If this issue 
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was not preserved Mr. Schubarth argues plain error. "Plain error requires a showing that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i,e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
out come for the [appellant]." State v. Garcia. 18 P.3d 1123 ^ 6, (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
ANALYSIS 
In this matter, Mr. Schubarth believes that the manner in which the State of Utah 
argued and the way the trial Court interpreted the plea agreement to be in direct conflict 
with the written terms of the agreement. Specifically, Mr. Schubarth believes the trial 
court used a time is of the essence standard, instead of a substantial compliance standard 
in determining whether Mr. Schubarth was in compliance with the six month payment due 
date. 
The terms of the plea in abeyance agreement are as follows: 
First, Mr. Schubarth was to pay restitution in the amount of $274,550.00. R.at 
360. The agreement further states, "[djefendant shall make full payment of restitution on 
or before November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of restitution on or before 
November 26, 2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result in the entry on the 
record of all pleas." R.at 360-361. 
Mr. Schubarth believes that the date of November 26, 2008 was a strict deadline 
and time was of the essence that all restitution payments had to be made on or before 
November 26, 2008, or Mr. Schubarth would be in violation of the agreement. However, 
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Mr. Schubarth believes that the six month payment dates were not strict, time is of the 
essence due dates, this is based on the written agreement. 
Second, the agreement stated, "[defendant shall make payments toward restitution 
in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 
have not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he 
has substantially complied with the restitution payments." R. at 360. 
It is important to note that this part of the agreement does not give specific dates 
that the payments are due. The agreement goes further explaining that it is possible that 
the $22,880.00 may not be paid within the six month period. In that event, the defendant 
was to appear in court and if the court found that he had substantially made the payment 
for that six month period he would not be in violation of the agreement. 
The clear language of the agreement shows that Mr. Schubarth was to have the full 
restitution payment of $274,550.00 paid by November 26, 2008. However, the individual 
six month payments did not need to be paid in full or on exact dates as long as Mr. 
Schubarth was making substantial payments toward the full restitution or substantial 
payment toward $22,880.00 for that six month period. 
Even the State's own testimony indicates that the six month periods and amounts 
were not exact periods of time or amounts. Mr. Thomas the prosecutor asked his witness 
Michael Hines, "Okay, and was it also ordered then that he was to make regular payments 
specifically approximately (bold and underlining added) $22,000.00 each six months? 
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That is correct". R.at 705. Tr. p. 19, line 12-15. Later, the witness was asked, "Okay. 
So the first six-month period would roughly (bold and underlining added) be around the 
May 26th date- That's correct". R.at 705, Tr. p. 20, line 10-12. 
The record clearly shows that even the State of Utah understood the agreement. 
That the six month payments did not have to be exactly complied with, that Mr. Schubarth 
could pay approximately the amount owed and pay it roughly within the six month period. 
However, in closing argument the State changed their story clearly arguing in direct 
contradiction to the agreement. The State argued that there was a specific due date and 
that Mr. Schubarth was late in the payment. In the Court's findings it is clear that he 
followed the State's argument when the Court stated, "he did not make payment of 
$22,880.00 on the due date." R. at 705, Tr. p. 58, line 5-6. 
When interpreting a document, the language of the document should be interpreted 
in a way that gives full meaning to all provisions of the document. Culbertson v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 44 P. 3d 642 ^ 15, (Utah 2002). If the 
document is interpreted as the State has argued and in accordance with the court's finding 
then the language that the defendant was to appear before the court to determine if he has 
substantially complied with the restitution payments, has no meaning. Further, the court 
did not make appropriate findings that Mr. Schubarth did not comply as per the 
agreement. Finally, since it was the State of Utah that drafted the agreement all 
ambiguities should be construed against the State of Utah. 
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Therefore, since the Court did not use the appropriate standard in determining 
whether Mr. Schubarth had substantially complied with the agreement and since the Court 
did not make appropriate findings the order terminating probation and entering Mr. 
Schubarth's guilty pleas should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The plea bargain is in direct violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-2(5). 
Therefore, there is obvious reversible error and the court should declare a misplea, 
because either party will be prejudiced. The matter should be set for a trial. 
The State of Utah did not provide sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that 
Mr. Schubarth had violated a law; by writing a bad check. Further, the trial court erred by 
not allowing Mr. Schubarth the opportunity to confront the witnesses that claimed that he 
had written a bad check. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the plea agreement. The trial court 
applied a time is of the essence standard, instead of a substantial compliance standard as 
stated in the agreement. Wherefore, Mr. Schubarth requests that the matter be remanded 
and the correct standard applied to this case. 
DATED this /ID th day of August 2004. 
BryanuSidwell 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant's brief was sent to the 
following by placing them in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid on August iv. 2004. 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S. 6th FL 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Bryan Sidwell 
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Affidavit of Defendant in Advance of Guilty Plea Agreement R. 344-366 
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Exhibit 2 R. 707 
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ATTACHMENT A 
G. Mark Thomas, #6664 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Telephone:(435) 781-5438 
Fax: (435) 781-5428 *£> 7 
.ax 
JOA 
JTAH 
"~i~Hk 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ~"~"~°EPLn> 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH 
DOB: 07/09/1955 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN 
ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND AGREEMENT 
Case No. 011800L66 
Judge John R. Anderson 
I, Michael Richard Schubarth, hereby acknowledge and certify 
that I have been advised of and that I understand the following 
facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading jjjjiiiry to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
1. Securities Fraud 
2 . Securities Fraud 
3 . Securities Fraud 
4. Securities Fraud 
5. Securities Fraud 
Degree 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Securities Fraud 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Degree 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Second Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
1 to 15 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
llj, 
23 
24 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
£L 
Crime & Statutory-
Provision 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Sale of Unregistered 
Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
Employment of 
Unlicensed Agent 
Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity 
Degree 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Third Degree 
Felony 
Pun is lament 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Max. $5,000.00 Fine 
0 to 5 Years USP 
Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine 
Felony 1 to 15 Years USP 
I have received a copy of the Information against me. I 
have read it, or had it read to me, and I understand tfye nature and 
elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime (s) to which I am pleading 
"gpjJLity a r e : 
COUNT 1 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about July 7, 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did willfully, 
in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security to 
James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed any device scheme 
or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading; and/or engaged in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operated or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the amount was 
$10,000. 
COUNT 2 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 11, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 3 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about October 2000, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Dusty (Johnson) Grothusen, directly or indirectly; 
employed any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; 
and/or engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and 
the amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 4 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 16, 2001, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Brian Jensen, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 5 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 12, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Michael Nielson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 6 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about January 29, 2001, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Brian Skinner, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 7 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about November 16, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made ciny untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was $10,000. 
COUNT 8 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about December 18, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 9 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on or about November 29, 2000, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did 
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security to Olin Draney, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 10 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 21, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 11 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about November 10, 2000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any 
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was less than $10,000. 
COUNT 12 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 6, 2 000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 13 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 15, 2 000, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, 
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed 
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the 
amount was more than $10,000. 
COUNT 14 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about July 7, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James 
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 15 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 11, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James 
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 16 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about October 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Dusty 
(Johnson) Grothusen, in Utah which was not registered with the 
Division, nor was the investment a federally covered security for 
which a notice filing had been made with the Division, nor did the 
security qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 17 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 16, 2001, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian 
Jensen, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 18 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 12, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Michael 
Nielson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 19 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY# a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 29, 2001, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH# a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian 
Skinner, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 20 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 16, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott 
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 21 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 18, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH# a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott 
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 22 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 29, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Olin 
Draney, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 23 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 21, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie 
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 24 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 10, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie 
Pierce# in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was 
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 25 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 6, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene 
Thompson# in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 26 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 15, 2000, in 
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party 
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene 
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor 
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice 
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security 
qualify for an exemption from registration. 
COUNT 27 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about September 
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, 
did willfully employ or engage Amy J. Garcia, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 28 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT# a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about December 
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, 
did willfully employ or engage James E. Burns, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 29 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT# a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000, 
through in or about December 2 000, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did 
willfully employ or engage Lloyd V, Wales, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 30 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony, 
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000, 
through in or about December 2 000, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did 
willfully employ or engage Nathan S. Hardman, an agent who was not 
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities. 
COUNT 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, from on or about June 16, 2000 
through January 29, 2001 in violation of §76-10-1603, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD 
SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, received proceeds derived, 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity as more 
fully defined in Counts 1 through 3 0 above, in which they 
participated as a principal, or they used or invested, directly or 
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, 
or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of those 
proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise; through a pattern of unlawful 
activity acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, any 
interest in or control of any enterprise; or were employed by, or 
associated with any enterprise and conducted or participated, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. The unlawful 
activity included three or more violations of securities fraud. 
¥ 
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y2> I understand that by pleading 'g^ ririry I will be a*3mittfflg 
r£hat 7. ^ ^mfiittcd the crimes listed above. I stipulate and agree 
that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts 
provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove 
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
Count(s) 1-13 SECURITIES FRAUD 
Count(s) 13-26 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY 
Count(s) 27-30 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT 
Count 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
£ Waiver of Constitutional Rights I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that 
I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and the 
United States. I also understand that if I plead' g^tri±y I will 
give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented a 
by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (Ij^ Ve) waived my right to counsel. I certify 
that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and 
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. 
I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
!i 
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^ If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Blake Nakamura. My attorney and I have fully discussed this 
statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
^V Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be 
gijving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know 
that if I were to have a trial I would have the right to see and 
observe the witnesses in open court who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who 
testified against me in open court. 
Vkft Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to and I would be able 
to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to 
appear, the State would pay those costs. 
t\p* Right to testify and privilege against self-
incrimination. I know that if I were to have a trial, I would have 
the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give 
evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me and if it were a non-jury trial, the judge would not hold my 
refusal against me. 
* 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know 
that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed innocent until the 
State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime (s) . If I choose 
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would 
have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
XJQ I understand that if ,1^plead guilty, I give up the 
presumption of innocence and wil]/\be admitting fchat I coraftjrfcfeed the 
crime(s) stated above. 
v 
/> Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I 
were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal 
my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I undeirstand that 
I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. 
^ /Off (jfrSftJ 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional rights 
as explained above.
 0 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the minimum and maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am pleading 
guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a 
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include 
a jail/prison term, fine, or both. 
v^ I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent 
(85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered 
to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if 
there is more than one crime involved, the sentences may be imposed 
one after another (consecutively) , or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently) . I know that I may be charged an additional fine 
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on 
probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty 
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on 
me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when 
I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to 
impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on 
the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or 
sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or suspended 
sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made 
or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not 
binding on the judge. 
< & 
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Defendants Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No 
force, threats, of unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an 
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in 
it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 4 I years of age. I have attended school through the 
I 2/M grade. I can read and understand the English language. If 
I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to 
me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be 
mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, 
or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am 
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my 
plea. i ^ 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my %»*i±fey plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days 
after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered. 
I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. 
I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Plea bargain. My plea is a result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties 
and provisions of this plea agreement, if any, are fully contained 
in this agreement and are as follows: 
1. I hereby enter my plea of guilty to the charges of: 
Count(s) 1 - 1 3 SECURITIES FRAUD 
Count(s) 1 3 - 2 6 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY 
Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0 EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT 
Count 31 PATTERN OE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
Jp Corner 
2. Upon acceptance of the ^ trirtty plea, the State does 
hereby recommend that the Court place the plea in abeyance and not 
cause it to be entered upon the records for a period of SIX (6) 
YEARS on the following terms: 
a. Defendant hereby agrees to make himself 
available to report to the Court whenever requested to do so and 
further agrees to keep both his attorney and the Uintah County 
Attorney apprised as to his current mailing address at all times. 
b. Defendant hereby agrees to violate no laws of 
the United States, the State of Utah, or any municipality during 
the term of this agreement. In the event that Defendant is 
arrested, cited, or otherwise charged with any violation, Defendant 
a 
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shall notify the County Attorney's office within 72 hours of said 
violation. 
c. Defendant shall pay restitution to named victims 
as listed in the information and victims listed herein which are 
not listed in the information as follows: 
James Burns $50,000.00 
Dusty Grothusen $11,000.00 
Brian Jensen $14,000.00 
Michael Nielson $15,000.00 
Brian Skinner $35,000.00 
Scott Sorenson $12,500.00 
Olin Draney $9,100.00 
Julie Peirce $7,500.00 
Arlene Thompson $59,000.00 
Darlene Burns $20,000.00 
Mark Caldwell $5,000.00 
Lisa Glick $10,000.00 
Floyd Morton $5,000.00 
Linette Rollins $10,000.00 
Dale Kidd $10,000.00 
Carol Dixon $1,450.00 
TOTAL $274,550.00 
d. Defendant shall make payments toward restitution 
in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the 
amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear 
in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially 
complied with the restitution payments./ The sole i^ s<ie for review 
is whether there has been substantial compli^6e with the payment 
agreement. The defendant expressly waives any/right he may have 
for the court to hear arguments concerning his ability to pay. \ 
e. Defendant shall make full payment of restitution 
on or before November 26, 2 008. Failure to pay the full amount of 
restitution on or before November 26, 2008 is a violation of this 
agreement and shall result in the entry on the record of all pleas. 
H!> Full payment of restitution is an absolute term of this 
agreement. Failure by defendant to pay full restitution for any 
reason shall result in a violation of this agreement and result in 
the entry of all pleas on the record. 
\o That this matter come before the court for review on the 
second law and motion day in Npv^mber 2003, at 10:00 a.m. or at 
such other time as the Court may hereinafter set. If at that time 
the Court finds that all the restitution has been paid and there 
have been no other violations of the plea agreement, the defendant 
will be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charges of 
(1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES# 
(27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OP 
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the court may then entertain a motion from 
the Defendant to dismiss these charges. The State will concur in 
such motion if there have been no violations of the agreement, the 
restitution.has been paid and there are no violations pending. 
Count 26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES will then enter 
against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced on 
said charge. The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison 
time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this 
matter. The State will argue for a term of probation not to exceed 
1 year. The State will not object to a Motion by the defendant to 
reduce the charge to the next lower category only in the following 
circumstances: 
j& 
on 
a. Defendant is placed on probation; 
b. Defendant is subsequently discharged from probation 
without violating any terms of his probation; 
c. Defendant violates no laws during the term of his 
probation an up until his motion to reduce the category 
of the offense; and 
d. Defendant successfully completes the term of his 
probation. 
If the defendant does not have all the restitution paid 
or beforejEtoyeffiber* 26, 2003, but does have the restitution paid 
on or before Meveinber 26, 2008, then this matter will come before 
the court for review on the second law and motion day in November 
2008, at 10:00 a.m. or at such other time as the Court may 
hereinafter set. If at that time the Court finds that all the 
restitution has been paid and there have been no other violations 
of the plea agreement, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw 
his plea of guilty to the charges of (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-
26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OP 
UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the 
court may then entertain a motion from the Defendant to dismiss 
these charges. The State will concur in such motion if there have 
been no violations of the agreement, the restitution has been paid 
and there are no violations pending. 
Counts 23-2 6, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, will then 
enter against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced 
on said charges. The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison 
& 
time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this 
matter. The State will argue for probation. 
If, at any time during the term hereof, it comes to 
ma. u i 
the attention of the Uintah County Attorney that Defendant has 
failed to comply with any of the terms of this agreement, the 
County Attorney may then go to the Court and request, by 
appropriate motion and affidavit, an Order to Show Cause requiring 
Defendant to appear and show cause why judgement for (1-13) 
SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, (27-30) 
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL 
ACTIVITY should not be imposed and Defendant sentenced accordingly. 
Service of said Order to Show Cause may be had upon defense counsel 
and Defendant does hereby waive personal service upon him of any 
such order. If, after a hearing, the Court makes a finding that 
there is evidence that Defendant has failed to strictly comply with 
all terms of this agreement it shall immediately order imposition 
of the (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN 
OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY judgement and Defendant shall be sentenced 
accordingly. 
Dated this 26th day of November, 2002 
MICHAEL RICHA: 
DEFENDANT 
<^V*-£ j, 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for MICHAEL RICHARD 
SCHUBARTH, the defendant above, and that I know he has read the 
statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with 
him and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime (s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, ^ r_e accurate and true. 
BLAgE^AKAMURA 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
21 
6? 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) 
is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached 
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support 
the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) 
are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
G. MARK THOMAS 
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
22 
Order 
The Court, having heard the representations made to it by 
counsel, having determined that Defendant is fully aware of his 
constitutional rights and of the purpose of this proceeding, 
accepts Defendant's pleas of guilty and finds that it is knowingly 
made and that he is under no undue stress or influence. The Court 
further approves the terms of the agreement set forth hereinabove 
and orders that Defendant's plea of guilty be placed in abeyance 
and that judgment not be entered against Defendant at this time but 
rather that imposition of judgment be stayed pursuant to the terms 
of the above set forth agreement until the Law and 
Motion Calendar in or until such other time as the 
Court may order. Until such time as judgment is formally entered 
herein against Defendant, or charges are dismissed against 
Defendant, Defendant is ordered to comply with all terms of the 
above set forth agreement and failure to do so shall be dealt with 
accordingly to the terms thereof. 
DATED this 2 6th day of November, 2( 
TDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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ATTACHMENT! J 
NO. SJC 03-982 
DEPARTMENT NO. 2 
In the Justice Court of Sparks Township, County of Washoe 
STATE OF NEVADA 
The State of Nevada 
PLAINTIFF 
vs. 
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH 
DEFENDANT 
COMPLAINT OF 
MEGAN RACHOW 
AGENCY NO. SPD 03-3155 
DA NO. 311100 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
CHARGING: CT. I. DRAWING AND PASSING A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT 
FUNDS WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD, all misdemeanors. 
DATE 
2003 
PROCEEDINGS 
May-
June 
June 
09 
02 
03 
Complaint filed on the above charge having occurred on or about 
the 31st day of December, 2002. 
Summons issued to Sparks Police Department for Defendant to appear 
at Sparks Justice Court on the 2nd day of June, 2003, at 8:15AM. 
Defendant failed to appear. 
A BENCH warrant has been issued in the amount of $500.00 CASH ONLY 
for FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR ARRAIGNMENT. 
IJ&X) Ao. ...y >hi is <\ fas ann' co;;ect G 
the cuaxtan of the or** , rocortf a * ihai!', ^ j ^ t ^ X Z 
Janine Baker, Clerk, Sparks Jusxe's Court 
